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The promise and pitfalls of restructuring network industries
Abstract
This paper examines the competitive effects of reorganizing a network industry's vertical structure. In
this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally
differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential pitfalls of restructuring
integrated network industries are analyzed: (i) double marginalization, (ii) underinvestment and (iii)
vertical foreclosure. The paper studies the net effect of restructuring on retail prices and cost-reducing
investment and discusses policy implications.
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1 Introduction
It is widely believed that introducing competition is the key to achieving the
full benefits of privatization in previously monopolized and regulated network
industries, such as telecommunications, electricity or railways.1 The recent
wave of “deregulation” in these industries–i.e. the introduction of competi-
tion into statutory monopolies–is certainly consistent with this view. The
traditional approach towards introducing downstream competition has been
to restructure the industry by breaking up the integrated dominant firm
and prohibiting the upstream monopolist to reenter the downstream market.
Well-known divestitures of this type include the breakup of AT&T in the
United States in 1984 and the breakup of British Rail in Great Britain in
1994. A less radical approach–often adopted in the 1990’s by European
countries deregulating their national telecommunications markets–allows
the upstream monopolist to remain integrated and attempts to create a level
playing field for the downstream competitors by regulating the access prices.2
Yet another approach was adopted in the recent deregulation of the German
electric power industry, where regulations have been removed altogether and
even access charges are freely determined by the industry.
Industrial organization theory suggests that irrespective of the approach
adopted, the restructuring of network industries with natural monopoly char-
acteristics upstream is subject to the following potential pitfalls:
• double marginalization: the introduction of imperfect downstream com-
petition leads to successive markups which imply higher prices for the
final good and lower aggregate welfare;3
• underinvestment: downstream competition may reduce the monopo-
list’s incentive to invest in network infrastructure.
• vertical foreclosure: when competing with new entrants, the monopo-
list may have incentives to raise downstream rivals’ cost by charging
1See Newbery (2000) for a survey on the state of the debate.
2See Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) for a recent analysis of the role of competition in
telecommunications.
3The classic reference is Spengler (1950); Tirole (1988, Chapter 4) and Perry (1989)
provide surveys on market outcomes in vertically related industries.
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excessive wholesale or access prices.4
Somewhat surprisingly, both regulators and antitrust authorities have
rarely addressed these potential pitfalls when restructuring vertically inte-
grated network industries, even though the extensive literature on intercon-
nection is either explicitly or implicitly based on the problem of vertical
foreclosure.
This paper takes the pitfalls of restructuring network industries seriously
and studies both pricing and investment behavior of a network monopolist
under the most common forms of market structure, i.e. (i) vertical integration
without downstream competition, (ii) vertical separation, where the upstream
monopolist is fully separated from the imperfectly competitive downstream
market, and (iii) liberalization, where the upstream monopolist is allowed to
operate in the imperfectly competitive downstreammarket. We consider net-
work industries producing a given number of final products that are imperfect
substitutes. More specifically, we will assume that the eﬀect of a price in-
crease on own demand dominates the cross-eﬀects on competitors’ demands,
i.e. the analysis is best applied to industries with strongly diﬀerentiated or
branded products, such as railways or telecommunications services.
The paper adds to the literature in several respects. First, it extends
earlier work by Greenhut and Ohta (1976 and 1978), Perry (1978), and Har-
ing and Kaserman (1978) which focused on integration and separation in
the Cournot model, by considering the case of liberalization and analyzing
Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated final products. The extension to the
liberalization scenario is important for two reasons: (i) liberalization plays a
significant role in the restructuring of European network industries; (ii) un-
der liberalization, the well-known double marginalization eﬀects crucial for
comparing integration and separation are supplemented by strategic pricing
incentives on the part of the integrated network monopolist, with ambiguous
net eﬀects on access and retail prices.
Second, the paper examines the network operator’s incentive to invest into
cost reduction under the diﬀerent forms of vertical market structure. The
4See Rey and Tirole (forthcoming) for a recent survey of the foreclosure literature.
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underinvestment problem is an important aspect of restructuring network
industries that has largely been ignored in the previous literature.5
Third, the paper provides the first analysis of the pros and cons of a net-
work monopolist’s downstream participation that allows for strategic third-
degree price discrimination by the network monopolist, introducing a real
possibility of a vertical price squeeze.6 As pointed out above, this is partic-
ularly relevant for the liberalization scenario.
Throughout the analysis, the paper deliberately abstracts from access or
retail price regulations, both in the benchmark case of vertical integration and
the cases of separation and liberalization, thus isolating the eﬀects generated
by the restructuring of the industry. As a result, we may discuss the role
that access or retail price regulations should play in moving the industry from
one equilibrium to another, rather than imposing a particular equilibrium by
imposing arbitrary rules of price regulation.
Under reasonable assumptions on demand, we derive the following re-
sults. First, vertically separating an integrated network industry is likely
to increase retail prices, since it tends to reduce the network monopolist’s
perceived price elasticity of demand. The driving force of this result is the
well-known double marginalization associated with vertical separation. The
eﬀect of liberalization on retail prices, however, is less clear, since pricing
decisions are not only aﬀected by double marginalization, but also by the in-
tegrated firm’s incentive to strategically manipulate access and retail prices
so as to foreclose separated downstream rivals. Second, as the monopolist’s
investments into cost reduction are driven by aggregate demand for the in-
termediate good, restructuring an integrated network industry may not only
lead to higher retail prices, but also to lower investment into cost reduction,
thereby generating adverse welfare eﬀects. Third, using a simple linear de-
mand model, we demonstrate that in the case of liberalization, practicing
vertical foreclosure might not be profitable from the integrated firm’s point
of view. Put diﬀerently, even if access prices are not regulated, the inte-
5See Buehler et al. (forthcoming) for an analysis of the network operator’s incentive to
invest into infrastructure quality.
6In related papers, Mandy (2000) and Weisman and Kang (2001) analyze the incentives
to “sabotage” downstream rivals using non-price strategies.
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grated firm may find it more profitable to divert the competitor’s demand by
lowering its retail price rather than raising the competitor’s access charge.
The policy implications of this exercise are instructive. The introduction
of imperfect downstream competition does not necessarily generate welfare
gains in the absence of downstream innovation, such as new products or
more eﬃcient firms.7 In particular, if regulatory and antitrust authorities
are aiming at lower retail prices and higher social welfare, they may find
the breakup of a dominant vertically integrated firm undesirable. Similarly,
in order to move a vertically separated or even liberalized industry into a
more favorable equilibrium than the one that emerges under integration,
carefully crafted access price regulations are necessary to limit the network
monopolist’s market power. The phasing out of “residual regulation” called
for by some policy makers thus appears to be problematic. More generally, it
is not evident that containing the monopolist’s market power is easier or less
costly under separation or liberalization than under integration. It therefore
remains to be explained by models of dynamic innovation in the downstream
sector why the standard practice is to replace vertically integrated monopolies
with regulated retail prices by (partially) separated upstream monopolies
with regulated access (and retail) prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the
basic setup of the model. It discusses the main assumptions and outlines the
cost structures of the various firms. Section 3 develops the case of vertical
integration as a benchmark. Section 4 compares equilibrium prices and in-
vestment under vertical separation and integration. Section 5 analyzes the
case of liberalization and compares its equilibrium outcome with vertical
integration and separation. Section 6 concludes.
7This result may be overturned if there is suﬃcient downstream innovation. To study
the conditions for this to happen, one would have to endogenize the entry and exit decisions
of potential downstream competitors and analyze their eﬀect on overall eﬃciency over time,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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2 The Basic Setup
Wemodel the production and selling of a diﬀerentiated final product provided
over a network as an industry with a vertical structure. Suppose that in order
to produce the final good (e.g. railway services), the seller needs access to an
intermediate good produced by a monopolist. For simplicity, assume that to
provide one unit of the final product (e.g. one passenger mile), one unit of
the homogenous intermediate good (e.g. one mile of track) is required. The
sellers’ variable costs are constant and normalized to zero. The diﬀerentiated
final product is sold on n markets with downward-sloping demand Di(p),
i = 1, ..., n, where p = (p1, ..., pn) is the vector of retail prices. Aggregate
demand for the intermediate good is thus given by D(p) ≡
Pn
i=1Di(p).
The constant unit cost c(e) of providing the intermediate good depends on
the level of eﬀort e that is exerted by the network operator to reduce this
cost; implementing a positive eﬀort is costly, which is reflected in a strictly
increasing cost function ψ(e). Finally, suppose that there is a fixed cost F of
operating the network.
In the various industry configurations, we model the provision of the final
good as a two-stage game with the following course of events.
• Stage 1: The network monopolist chooses both the cost-reducing eﬀort
e and the per unit access charge ai for each of the downstream firms
i = 1, ..., n (i.e. there is no fixed component in access charges).
• Stage 2: Given the access charges ai, each downstream firm i sets the
retail price pi for the provision of the final good.
Observe that in the case of vertical integration, the network operator is
also owner of all retail firms i = 1, ..., n and thus faces a simple optimiza-
tion problem. In the case of vertical separation, the network operator and
the downstream competitors play a sequential game which can be solved
using backward induction. In the case of liberalization, where the network
operator is vertically integrated with at least one downstream firm and faces
downstream competitors, a sequential game between the integrated network
operator and its downstream competitors is played (see Figure 1).
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<Figure 1 about here>
Throughout the paper, we require that the following basic assumptions
are satisfied:
[A1] The final products are demand substitutes and strategic complements,
i.e. ∂Di(p)/∂pi < 0, ∂Di(p)/∂pj ≥ 0 and ∂2Di(p)/∂pi∂pj ≥ 0, i, j =
1, ..., n, i 6= j.8
[A2] Demand functions are exchangeable in the sense that the following
conditions hold:9
(i) For any firm i, a permutation of the vector p−i does not change
the demand Di(pi,p−i).
(ii) If i 6= j such that pi = pj and p−i is identical with p−j up to
permutation, then Di(p) = Dj(p).
[A3] The own eﬀect of a price change dominates the cross eﬀects both in
terms of the level and slope of demand, i.e.
P
j ∂Di(p)/∂pj < 0 and
∂2Di(p)/∂p2i +
P
j 6=i ∂2Di(p)/∂pi∂pj ≤ 0, i, j = 1, ..., n.10
[A4] The marginal cost of the network monopolist is decreasing in eﬀort such
that c0(e) < 0 and c00(e) > 0. The cost of providing eﬀort is positive
and increasing, i.e. ψ0(e) > 0, ψ00(e) > 0.
To understand the role of assumptions [A1]-[A3], consider the parameter
restrictions placed on the linear demand system given by
Di(p) = αi − βipi +
X
j 6=i
γijpj.
8Note that if the goods are demand substitutes and prices are larger than marginal cost,
it suﬃces that ∂2Di(p)/∂pi∂pj ≥ 0 in order for the goods to be strategic complements in
the neighborhood of a price equilibrium (Tirole, 1988, p. 337).
9As usual, p−i denotes the vector of prices of all firms except firm i.
10See Vives (1999, p. 150) for a discussion of such conditions. [A3] will be crucial for
the proof of Lemma 1 below, since it assures dpi/dai > 0 under separation (see Appendix
B).
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Assumption [A1] requires Di(p)/∂pi = −βi < 0 and ∂Di(p)/∂pj = γij ≥ 0,
which implies βi > 0 and γij ≥ 0.The additional condition ∂2Di(p)/∂pi∂pj ≥
0 does not restrict parameter values for the linear demand model. Part (i)
of [A2] requires that permutation of p−i does not aﬀect Di(pi,p−i), which
immediately implies γij = γi for all j. Part (ii) of [A2] imposes that Di(p) =
Dj(p) if pi = pj and p−i is identical to p−j up to permutation. It follows
that parameters must be symmetric, i.e. αi = α, βi = β and γi = γ for all i.
[A3] requires that that the own demand eﬀect of price changes dominates the
cross eﬀects for the level and slope of demand. Using [A1] and [A2], the first
condition implies
P
j ∂Di/∂pj = −β + (n − 1)γ < 0; the second condition
does not restrict the parameters of the linear model.
Summing up, the linear demand model satisfies assumptions [A1]-[A3] if
and only if
Di(p) = α− βpi +
X
j 6=i
γpj , with β > (n− 1)γ > 0. (1)
To illustrate the results derived for general demand functions below, we shall
often refer to the linear demand model given in (1), assuming n = 2 for
simplicity. Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of this model.
3 Vertical Integration
Suppose that there is a vertically integrated monopolist whose divisions
i = 1, ..., n serve all markets with demand Di(p) for the final good, i.e. the
integrated monopolist sets a market price pIi for each division i, where the
superscript I denotes “integration”. Its profit maximizing problem is then
given by
max
p,e
Π(p, e) =
nX
i=1
[pi − c(e)]Di (p)− ψ (e)− F.
The first-order conditions for equilibrium prices pIi and equilibrium eﬀort eI
are given by
pIi − c(eI)
pIi
=
1
εIii
−
P
j 6=i[pIj − c(eI)]Dj(pI)εIji
RIi εIii
, i = 1, ..., n, (2)
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and
−c0(eI)D(pI) = ψ0(eI), (3)
with
εji ≡ −
(∂Dj/∂pi)pi
Dj
denoting the price-elasticity of demand in division j with respect to the price
in division i. RIi ≡ pIiDi(pI) is the revenue of division i under vertical inte-
gration, where pI is the vector of equilibrium retail prices under integration.
(2) is the familiar Lerner index for a multiproduct monopoly with separa-
ble costs and dependent demands (see e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 70). For later
reference, let us rewrite (2) as
pIi − c(eI)
pIi
= EIi +XI−i, (4)
with EIi ≡ 1/εIii denoting the inverse price elasticity of demand for a mo-
nopolist serving market i, and
XI−i ≡ −
P
j 6=i[pIj − c(eI)]Dj(pI)εIji
RIi εIii
denoting the pricing externalities originating in market i and aﬀecting all
other markets j 6= i. It is important to note that a vertically integrated
monopolist takes into account that the final products oﬀered by its diﬀerent
divisions are substitutes (εji < 0 for i 6= j) and thus sets higher markups
than each of its division would set individually.
4 Vertical Separation
Under vertical separation, there is an upstream network monopolist com-
pletely separated from downstream operations and a set of independent
downstream oligopolists i = 1, ..., n. Given the access charge aSi chosen by
the upstream monopolist and the vector of retail prices pS−i set by all other
8
vertically separated downstream firms, firm i chooses its retail price so as to
max
pi
Πi(p, ai) =
¡
pi − aSi
¢
Di
¡
pi,pS−i
¢
.
The equilibrium retail price pSi is thus given by
pSi − aSi
pSi
=
1
εSii
, i = 1, ..., n, (5)
where εSii is the price elasticity of demand for firm i, now evaluated at pS
rather than pI . Given the vector of access prices a = (a1, ..., an) from the
game’s first stage, the equilibrium retail prices pSi (a) in the second stage
are functions of these access prices and characterized by the best-response
functions pbi(ai,pS−i) = pSi .With equilibrium retail prices denoted as pS(a) =
(pS1 (a), ..., pSn(a)), the upstream firm’s problem can be written as
max
a,e
Π(a, e) =
nX
i=1
[ai − c (e)]Di(pS(a))− ψ (e)− F.
The first-order condition for equilibrium access prices is then given by
aSi − c(eS)
aSi
= − Di(p
S)
aSi
P
j
∂Di
∂pj
∂pj
∂ai
−
P
j 6=i
£
aSj − c(eS)
¤P
k
∂Dj
∂pk
∂pk
∂ai
aSi
P
j
∂Di
∂pj
∂pj
∂ai
. (6)
Let us simplify (6) using the definition of εji introduced above, as well as the
elasticities of retail prices with respect to access charge ai given by
mji ≡
(∂pj/∂ai) ai
pj
.
In addition, let RSi ≡ aSi Di(pS) denote the monopolist’s access revenue from
product i under vertical separation. First-order condition (6) then simplifies
to
aSi − c
¡
eS
¢
aSi
= ESi +XS−i, (7)
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with
ESi ≡
1P
j εSijmSji
denoting the inverse price elasticity of demand for a vertically separated
upstream monopolist serving market i, and
XS−i ≡ −
P
j 6=i[aSj − c(eS)]Dj(pS)
P
k εSjkmSki
RSi
P
j εSijmSji
denoting the pricing externalities aﬀecting markets j 6= i. While the first-
order condition for equilibrium eﬀort
−c0(eS)D(pS) = ψ0(eS) (8)
has the same form as under integration, equilibrium access prices aS =
(aS1 , ..., aSn) are now given by a generalized form of the Lerner index. First-
order condition (7) indicates that the monopolist must account for the fact
that price changes in market i are first translated into retail price changes
through mji before they aﬀect access demand through εij. More specifically,
equation (7) shows that the industry’s vertical separation aﬀects the pricing
incentives of the network monopolist in two related ways:
(i) Vertical separation changes the perceived inverse price elasticity of de-
mand in market i from EIi to ESi . Instead of directly aﬀecting demand
via εii, an increase of the monopolist’s price first aﬀects the pricing de-
cisions of the downstream firms via the elasticities of retail prices mji.
Only through the associated changes of retail prices does an increase
of ai aﬀect the demand for access in market i.
(ii) Vertical separation changes the pricing externalities between markets
from XI−i to XS−i. As under vertical integration, the upstream monop-
olist accounts for the externalities between markets i and j 6= i when
setting its prices. But just as within each market, variations of ac-
cess prices now only indirectly aﬀect the demand for the final good.
An increase of the access price ai generates demand eﬀects–if any–in
markets j 6= i only after translation viamji into changes of retail prices.
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To compare the equilibrium outcomes under vertical integration and sep-
aration, it is thus crucial to know how downstream firms pass on increases
of access charges. The following Lemma establishes that firms only partially
pass on changes in access charges.
Lemma 1 Suppose that there is a unique interior equilibrium under separa-
tion characterized by aS and pS. Then
0 ≤ mSji < mSii ≤ 1, i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 states that firm i will not find it optimal to fully
pass on increases of its access charge ai to its customers, i.e. mii ≤ 1. At
the same time, firms j 6= i welcome the increase of ai since the associated
increase of pi shifts out their demand schedules, allowing them to adjust their
prices pSj upwards. Therefore, mji > 0, j 6= i, and the substitution eﬀects
generated by the cost increase of firm i are mitigated.
4.1 Equilibrium Retail Prices for Given Eﬀort
We now study the conditions for which retail prices are higher under sepa-
ration than integration. For general demand functions, a direct comparison
of pSi (aS(eS)) and pIi (c(eI)) using (2) and (5) is not instructive. Instead, we
proceed in two steps. First, we fix the eﬀort level at e ≡ e¯ and compare
the Lerner index for retail prices under integration with the Lerner index
for access charges under separation, using the fact that–for a given eﬀort
level–retail prices under separation must be higher than access charges by
the profit maximizing behavior of downstream firms. Second, we show that
if eﬀort is chosen endogenously, the eﬀort level is generally smaller under
separation than integration. Therefore, marginal cost must be higher un-
der vertical separation than under integration, which reinforces higher retail
prices under separation.
Comparing (4) and (7), our first main result gives a suﬃcient condition
for the retail prices to be higher under separation than under integration:
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Proposition 1 Suppose eﬀort is fixed at e¯. Then changing the industry’s
structure from integration to separation strictly increases retail prices if¡
ESi −EIi
¢
+
¡
XS−i −XI−i
¢
≥ 0 for all i. (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of proposition 1 is straightforward. Recall that EIi = 1/εIii
and ESi = 1/(εSiimSii+
P
j 6=i εSijmSji) denote the monopolists’ perceived inverse
price elasticity of demand in market i under integration and separation, re-
spectively; similarly, XI−i and XS−i denote the pricing externalities generated
in market i. Proposition 1 thus simply states that retail prices increase if
separating the industry reduces the monopolist’s perceived price elasticity of
demand more strongly than it reduces the pricing externalities.
According to Lemma 1, it is natural to expect vertical separation to reduce
the perceived price elasticity of demand: First,mij ≥ 0 implies
P
j 6=i εSijmSji ≤
0. Second, under vertical separation εii is scaled downwards bymii ≤ 1. Both
eﬀects unambiguously support a reduction of the perceived price elasticity.
However, there may be a countervailing eﬀect, since εIii and εSii are evaluated
at diﬀerent sets of retail prices. Yet, for this countervailing eﬀect to dominate,
we must have εSii À εIii. There is no obvious reason why this should be the
case.
The linear demand model with n = 2 illustrates that the monopolist’s
perceived price elasticity is likely to decrease: Using the equilibrium prices
given in (A1), (A4) and (A5) of Appendix A, we can show that due to β > γ
by assumption, we have
ESi =
(β − γ) (γ + 2β) (α− βc+ γc)
(α+ βc− γc)
¡
2β2 − γ2
¢ > EIi = (β − γ) (α− βc+ γc)β (α+ βc− γc) , (10)
i.e. the perceived price elasticity of demand decreases with the industry’s
vertical separation
¡
ESi − EIi > 0
¢
.
Condition (9) indicates, however, that there might be a countervailing
eﬀect associated with the pricing externalities between markets. In fact, for
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the linear demand model, we find
XS−i =
γβ (α− βc+ γc)
(α+ βc− γc)
¡
2β2 − γ2
¢ < XI−i = γ (α− βc+ γc)β (α+ βc− γc) (11)
for β > γ, i.e. vertical separation reduces the pricing externalities between
markets
¡
XS−i −XI−i < 0
¢
. In the linear demand model, these two eﬀects of
vertical separation cancel, so that the retail prices under integration are just
equal to the access prices under separation (pIi = aSi , i = 1, 2).Condition (9) is
thus satisfied with equality, and the retail prices under separation are strictly
higher than under integration (see Result 1 in Appendix A), as predicted by
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 relies on a given level of marginal cost. However, the level
of marginal cost is not exogenous but depends on the endogenous choice of
eﬀort. In the next section, we shall study this choice of eﬀort and how it
aﬀects equilibrium prices.
4.2 Choice of Eﬀort
Consider the first-order conditions (3) and (8) for equilibrium choice of eﬀort.
Observe that in both market configurations, the equilibrium eﬀort e∗ chosen
by the upstream monopolist satisfies a condition of the form
−c0(e∗)D(p∗) = ψ0(e∗). (12)
If the equilibrium retail prices were the same both under integration and
separation, i.e. p∗ = pI = pS, the equilibrium eﬀort e∗ would have to be
the same in both market configurations. However, if for any given level
of eﬀort, equilibrium retail prices are higher under separation and D(p) is
decreasing in p, the equilibrium eﬀort e∗ must be smaller under separation
than under integration. As a consequence, the marginal cost of the upstream
monopolist c(eS) is higher under separation than under integration c(eI).
The next proposition summarizes the second result.
Proposition 2 Suppose the assumptions of proposition 1 hold. Then, if
the network monopolist chooses eﬀort endogenously, eﬀort is higher under
13
vertical integration than under separation, i.e. eI > eS.
Intuitively, if retail prices are higher under separation than under inte-
gration, aggregate demand for the intermediate good is smaller under sepa-
ration. Therefore, the incentive to invest into cost reduction is also smaller.
Note that this result reinforces higher retail prices under vertical separation
(Proposition 1), since the mark-ups of access prices are based on a higher
level of marginal cost when eﬀort is smaller.
5 Liberalization
In the case of liberalization the upstream monopolist also operates in the
downstream market. To simplify, assume that the upstream monopolist op-
erates only firm 1 downstream (see Figure 1). Of course, the pricing rule
of the competing downstream firms remains unaltered, but now demand is
evaluated at a diﬀerent set of retail prices pL = (pL1 , ..., pLn). The equilibrium
retail prices pLi of the competing downstream firms thus satisfy the first-order
condition
pLi − aLi
pLi
=
1
εLii
, i = 2, ..., n, (13)
with εLii denoting the price elasticity of demand for firm i’s services under
liberalization.
The upstream monopolist’s problem is given by
max
p1,a,e
Π(p1, a, e) = [p1 − c(e)]D1(pL(a))
+
X
i6=1
[ai − c (e)]Di(pL(a))− ψ (e)− F.
The first-order condition for the equilibrium retail price in market 1 is given
by
pL1 − c(eL)
pL1
= EL1 +XL−1, (14)
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with EL1 ≡ 1/εL11 and
XL−1 ≡ −
P
j 6=1[aLj − c(eL)]Dj(pL)εLj1
RL1 εL11
.
Equilibrium access prices for the markets i = 2, ..., n satisfy the first-order
condition
aLi − c
¡
eL
¢
aLi
= ELi +XL−i, (15)
with
ELi ≡
1P
j εLijmLji
denoting the inverse price elasticity of demand for a monopolist serving mar-
ket i, and
XL−i ≡ −
£
pL1 − c(eL)
¤
D1(pL)
P
k εL1kmLki
RLi (pL)
P
j εLijmLji
−
P
j 6=i,j 6=1[aLj − c(eL)]Dj(pL)
P
k εLjkmLki
RLi (pL)
P
j εLijmLji
denoting the pricing externalities aﬀecting markets j 6= i. Equilibrium eﬀort
is given by the standard rule
−c0(eL)D(pL) = ψ0(eL). (16)
Note that whereas two first-order conditions are needed to characterize the
upstreammonopolist’s behavior under separation, three first-order conditions
are needed for liberalization. Consider the integrated downstream firm’s re-
tail price. Equation (14) indicates that the retail price in market 1 is coor-
dinated with the access prices set in all other markets j 6= 1 and therefore
internalizes the pricing externalities. The access prices, in turn, are set ac-
cording to (15) which is very similar to (7), in particular with respect to
the perceived inverse price elasticity of demand in market i. The diﬀerence
between these two conditions thus mainly concerns the pricing externalities
between markets: XL−i accounts for the fact that under liberalization, the
monopolist can set the retail price rather than the access price in market
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1. Finally, (16) indicates that the monopolist’s eﬀort is set according to the
same rule as under vertical integration.11
5.1 Liberalization v. Integration
To compare the equilibrium outcomes under liberalization and vertical inte-
gration, we proceed as above. First, we examine the conditions under which
the retail prices under liberalization are higher than those under integration
for a given eﬀort level. Second, we study the incentive to exert cost reducing
eﬀort.
Comparison of (4), (14) and (15) yields the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose eﬀort is fixed at e¯. Then changing the industry’s
structure from integration to liberalization strictly increases retail prices if¡
EL1 − EI1
¢
+
¡
XL−1 −XI−1
¢
> 0, and (17)¡
ELi − EIi
¢
+
¡
XL−i −XI−i
¢
≥ 0, for all i 6= 1. (18)
Proof. See Appendix.
Inspection of Proposition 3 indicates that the intuition of Proposition
1 remains intact, i.e. changing the industry structure from integration to
liberalization increases retail prices if, for each market, the monopolist’s per-
ceived demand elasticity is reduced more strongly than the pricing exter-
nalities. However, it is not as natural as before to expect that all retail
prices increase, since there are no cross-price elasticity terms unambiguously
supporting a decrease of the perceived price elasticity in market 1.
In particular, under liberalization the integrated monopolist has an in-
centive to set a low retail price in market 1 so as to divert demand from
its downstream competitors, thereby generating higher demand for the good
that is produced with lower marginal cost (due to the absence of double
marginalization). This incentive is clearly absent under vertical separation.
Nevertheless, the linear demand model suggests that it is still fairly nat-
ural to expect that retail prices turn out to be higher under liberalization
11Of course, all these terms also need to be evaluated at diﬀerent access and retail prices
compared to vertical separation and integration.
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than integration. In fact, Result 2 in Appendix A demonstrates that for
linear demand, we have pLi > pIi , i = 1, 2.
Consider now the incentive to exert eﬀort under liberalization. Since the
relevant first-order condition (16) has the same form as under integration and
separation, an analogous argument as above can be applied. Proposition 4
summarizes the result.
Proposition 4 Suppose the assumptions of proposition 3 hold. Then, if
the network monopolist chooses eﬀort endogenously, eﬀort is higher under
vertical integration than under liberalization, i.e. eI > eL.
Proposition 4 implies that if changing the industry’s structure from inte-
gration to liberalization increases retail prices for a given eﬀort e¯, it will do
so even more when eﬀort is endogenous.
We now proceed to a more detailed comparison of liberalization with
vertical separation.
5.2 Liberalization v. Separation
We have pointed out above that under liberalization, the upstream monop-
olist has an incentive to divert demand from his downstream competitors
to market 1 so as to generate higher demand for the good that is produced
with lower marginal cost. This can be established by setting a relatively low
retail price in market 1, or by setting relatively high access prices for the
other markets. Both strategies place the separated downstream rivals at a
competitive disadvantage. However, the broad notion of “placing competi-
tors at a disadvantage” is not suﬃciently precise. One needs to distinguish
between discrimination that is truly anticompetitive and discrimination that
harms rivals precisely because it is competitive (Klass and Salinger, 1995,
p. 677). The bulk of the recent literature on vertical foreclosure12 therefore
argues, starting from the notion of raising rivals’ cost (Salop and Scheﬀ-
man, 1983, 1987), that an integrated firm acts anticompetitively when rais-
12Important contributions include Chen (2001), Choi and Yi (2000), Church and Gandal
(2000), Riordan (1998), Sibley and Weisman (1998) and Ordover et al. (1990). See Rey
and Tirole (forthcoming) for a recent survey.
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ing rivals’ costs, but not when lowering the cost level of its own downstream
subsidiaries.
When comparing liberalization and separation, we follow this distinction
and say that there is vertical foreclosure if aLi > aSi , i = 2, ..., n. Of course,
retail prices remain important: Even if access charges are higher than under
separation, retail prices may actually turn out to be lower if the integrated
monopolist subjects its competitors to a price squeeze. That is, vertical
foreclosure is not necessarily associated with negative welfare eﬀects.
Unfortunately, for general demand functions little can be said about the
occurrence of vertical foreclosure and the comparison of access and retail
prices under liberalization and separation. We therefore confine ourselves to
making the following observation:
Observation 1 The monopolist’s pricing behavior under liberalization is gen-
erally diﬀerent from that under vertical separation.
To see that the monopolist’s pricing behavior under liberalization must
be diﬀerent from that under separation, suppose the contrary, i.e. assume
that for a given eﬀort level e¯, the integrated monopolist sets all access prices
such that aL = aS and chooses its retail price in market 1 so as to satisfy
pL1 = pS1 . First-order conditions (5) and (13) then imply pL = pS. Now
consider first-order conditions (15) and (7) for equilibrium access pricing.
Since the elasticities εij and mji are evaluated at the same prices both under
liberalization and separation, the inverses of the perceived price elasticities
in market i are equal, i.e. ELi (pS,aS) = ESi . Now consider the pricing ex-
ternalities. Since we must have pS1 > aS1 , it follows that XL−i(pS, aS) > XS−i.
This in turn implies aLi > aSi , hence a contradiction.
Let us consider the linear demand model discussed in Appendix A to
further explore the relation between liberalization and separation. The com-
parison of Lerner indices turns out to be rather tedious, and we thus resort to
a direct comparison of the explicit solutions for the various equilibrium prices
(holding eﬀort constant). Result 3 in Appendix A shows that retail prices are
lower under liberalization than under separation (pLi < pSi , i = 1, 2). That is,
changing the industry’s vertical structure from separation to liberalization
increases social welfare, because the integrated monopolist produces at lower
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marginal cost and thus sets a lower retail price, which induces its downstream
competitor to reduce its retail price. This is the eﬃciency eﬀect of firm 1’s
vertical integration.
Yet, this is not the whole story, since there might be a foreclosure eﬀect
of firm 1’s integration–reflected in an increase of firm 2’s access charge–
which may give rise to higher retail prices (relative to separation). However,
Result 4 in Appendix A demonstrates that in the linear demand model, the
foreclosure eﬀect of firm 1’s integration is “reversed”: the access charge falls
relative to separation (aL2 < aS2 ). The next observation summarizes this
finding.
Observation 2 In the linear demand model, vertical foreclosure does not
emerge in equilibrium.
Intuitively, the result follows from the fact that the monopolist has lower
marginal costs under liberalization, which will induce it to reduce its prices
both on the downstream and the upstream market. This eﬃciency eﬀect
dominates the strategic incentive to raise the access charge in the upstream
market in the linear demand model, so that the net eﬀect on the access charge
is negative.
6 Conclusions
The above analysis suggests that if a network industry’s final products are
diﬀerentiated, changing the vertical structure from unregulated, integrated
monopoly to separation or liberalization may be detrimental to social wel-
fare if not supplemented by adequate access or retail price regulation. The
argument holds a fortiori for the restructuring of a reasonably regulated in-
tegrated monopoly. Therefore, one may wonder why many countries have
recently attempted to restructure their network industries.
An obvious answer to this question would be that the costs of regulation
are lower under separation or liberalization than under integration (account-
ing for the costs of restructuring). It remains to be seen whether the ac-
cumulating empirical evidence is consistent with this view. Another answer
could probably be derived from a public choice model of the regulation of
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network industries. Finally, one could argue that opening up the downstream
sector to competition not only eﬀectively constrains the pricing behavior of
each active downstream firm, but also leads to a selection of more eﬃcient
firms over time, bringing about innovation that is unlikely to occur under
integrated statutory monopoly. While such selection may indeed occur, it
is unclear how introducing imperfect downstream competition can help to
control the network monopolist’s market power.
This brings us to the scope for future research. First, we abstracted
from downstream entry for simplicity. Endogenizing the entry decisions of
potentially more eﬃcient downstream competitors producing diﬀerentiated
products may prove instructive. Second, we focussed on cost-reducing in-
vestment, neglecting other types of downstream or upstream investment,
such as investment in network quality or advertisement for the final product.
Third, we ignored the fact that an integrated firm’s incentive to foreclose
its downstream competitors by price discrimination depends on the costs of
this strategy relative to non-price discrimination or sabotage. Allowing for
diﬀerent types of vertical foreclosure should enrich our understanding of a
network monopolist’s strategic behavior.
20
7 Appendix A: The Linear Demand Case
This appendix discusses the special case with linear demand and n = 2 downstream
firms. As pointed out in section 2, the linear demand model satisfying assumptions
[A1]-[A3] is given by
Di(pi, pj) = α− βpi + γpj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
with β > γ > 0 (see eq. (1)). Throughout, we assume that marginal cost is given
by the constant c > 0, i.e. we abstract from eﬀort considerations (Propositions 2
and 4 indicate that eﬀort considerations reinforce the results derived here).
7.1 Vertical Integration
The integrated monopolist solves the problem
max
pi,pj
Π(pi, pj) =
X
i
(pi − c) (α− βpi + γpj)− F, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Straightforward calculations yield the symmetric equilibrium retail prices
pIi =
α+ (β − γ) c
2 (β − γ) , i = 1, 2. (A1)
7.2 Vertical Separation
Consider the second stage of the game. For a given access charge ai, downstream
firm i chooses its retail price so as to
max
pi
Πi(pi, pj) = (pi − ai) (α− βpi + γpj) .
The first-order condition reads
∂Πi
∂pi
= (α− βpi + γpj)− β (pi − ai) = 0. (A2)
Retail prices are thus given by
pSi (ai, aj) =
αγ + 2βα+ 2β2ai + βγaj
4β2 − γ2
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (A3)
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In the first stage of the game, the separated upstream monopolist chooses access
charges so as to
max
ai,aj
Π(ai, aj) =
X
i
(ai − c)
¡
α− βpSi (ai, aj) + γpSj (aj , ai)
¢
− F,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Equilibrium access charges are thus given by
aSi =
α+ (β − γ) c
2 (β − γ) , i = 1, 2. (A4)
Plugging aSi into pSi (ai, aj) yields symmetric equilibrium retail prices
pSi =
β2c+ 3βα− βcγ − 2αγ
2 (2β − γ) (β − γ) , i = 1, 2. (A5)
7.3 Liberalization
Consider the second stage of the game. For a given access charge a2, downstream
firm 2 chooses its retail price so as to
max
p2
Π2(p1, p2) = (p2 − a2) (α− βp2 + γp1) .
The first-order condition is given by
∂Π2
∂p2
= α− 2βp2 + γp1 + βa2 = 0.
The integrated monopolist solves the problem
max
p1
Π2(p1, p2) = (p1 − c) (α− βp1 + γp2) + (a2 − c) (α− βp2 + γp1)− F.
The first-order condition is
∂Π1
∂p1
= α− 2βp1 + γp2 + βc+ γa2 − γc = 0.
Solving for equilibrium retail prices, we get
pL1 (a2) =
2βα− 2βcγ + 2β2c+ 3βγa2 + αγ
4β2 − γ2
; (A6)
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pL2 (a2) =
2βα+ βcγ + (2β + γ2)a2 + αγ − γ2c
4β2 − γ2
. (A7)
Now, consider the first stage of the game. Diﬀerentiating the integrated firm’s
profit function with respect to a2, it follows from the envelope theorem that
∂Π1
∂a2
= [(p1 − c) γ − (a2 − c)β]
∂p2
∂a2
+ (α− βp2 + γp1) = 0. (A8)
Solving the system of equations given by (A6), (A7) and (A8) yields the following
equilibrium prices:
aL2 =
8β4c+ 8β3α− 8β3cγ + 2β2cγ2 − 3βcγ3 + αγ3 + γ4c
2 (β − γ)
¡
γ2 + 8β2
¢
β
; (A9)
pL1 =
8cβ3 + 8β2α− 10β2cγ + 2βαγ + 5βγ2c− αγ2 − 3cγ3
2 (β − γ)
¡
γ2 + 8β2
¢ ; (A10)
pL2 =
4β4c+ 12β3α− 4αγβ2 − 4β2cγ2 + 2βαγ2 + βcγ3 − αγ3 − γ4c
2 (β − γ)
¡
γ2 + 8β2
¢
β
. (A11)
7.4 Comparing Equilibrium Prices
We now show a number of useful results to hold for the linear demand model.
Result 1 Retail prices are higher under separation than under integration, i.e. pSi >
pIi , i = 1, 2.
By first-order condition (A2), we must have pSi > aSi in any interior equilibrium
with strictly positive demand (α− βpi + γpj > 0). Comparison of equations (A4)
and (A1), in turn, indicates that aSi = pIi . It follows immediately that pSi > pIi .
Result 2 Retail prices are higher under liberalization than under integration, i.e. pLi >
pIi , i = 1, 2.
Consider the retail price of downstream firm 1. By (A10) and (A1), we have
pL1 > pI1 if
8cβ3 + 8β2α− 10β2cγ + 2βαγ + 5βγ2c− αγ2 − 3cγ3
2 (β − γ)
¡
γ2 + 8β2
¢ > α+ (β − γ) c
2 (β − γ) .
This condition is equivalent to 2γ (β − γ) (α− βc+ γc) > 0, which is satisfied due
to β > γ > 0 by assumption for strictly positive demand.
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With this result in place, pL2 > pL1 is suﬃcient to guarantee that pL2 > pI2. To
see that pL2 > pL1 actually holds, combine the first-order conditions (A6) and (A7)
to get ¡
4β2 − γ2
¢
(p2 − p1) = (2β − γ) (β − γ) (a2 − c) > 0,
which implies pL2 > pL1 .
Result 3 Retail prices are higher under separation than under liberalization, i.e. pSi >
pLi , i = 1, 2.
Consider the retail price of downstream firm 1. By (A5) and (A10), we have
pS1 > pL1 if
β2c+ 3βα− βcγ − 2αγ
2 (2β − γ) (β − γ) >
8cβ3 + 8β2α− 10β2cγ + 2βαγ + 5βγ2c− αγ2 − 3cγ3
2 (β − γ)
¡
γ2 + 8β2
¢ .
Straightforward calculations show that the latter condition is equivalent to
(β − γ)
¡
3γ2 − 4βγ + 8β2
¢
(α− βc+ γc) > 0,
which is satisfied because of β > γ > 0 by assumption for strictly positive demand.
Similar arguments show that pS2 > pL2 .
Result 4 The access charge under separation is higher than under liberalization,
i.e. aS1 = aS2 > aL2 .
By (A4) and (A9), we have aS2 > aL2 if
α+ (β − γ) c
2 (β − γ) >
8β4c+ 8β3α− 8β3cγ + 2β2cγ2 − 3βcγ3 + αγ3 + γ4c
2 (β − γ)
¡
γ2 + 8β2
¢
β
.
Calculations similar to those outlined above show that the latter condition is sat-
isfied due to β > γ > 0 by assumption for strictly positive demand.
8 Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show that 0 < mii ≤ 1. Let us start with deriving
∂pi/∂ai. Suppressing the superscript S, the system of first-order conditions for
equilibrium retail pricing under vertical separation is given by
Πii = Di(p) + (pi − ai)
∂Di (p)
∂pi
= 0, i = 1, ..., n. (B1)
24
Diﬀerentiating the cth equation of this system with respect to ai, accounting for
the changes in all downstream prices, yields
nX
k=1
·
(1 + δck)
∂Dc(p)
∂pk
+ (pc − ac)
∂2Dc(p)
∂pc∂pk
¸
dpk
dai
= δci
∂Di(p)
∂pi
,
where δck denotes the Kronecker delta (equal to one if c = k and zero otherwise).
Let
Πiij ≡ (1 + δij)
∂Di(p)
∂pj
+ (pi − ai)
∂2Di(p)
∂pi∂pj
, i, j = 1, ..., n.
denote the second derivative of downstream firm i’s profit function with respect
to pi and pj . In matrix form, the system of equations can then be written as


Π111 ... Π11n
...
. . .
...
Πnn1 ... Πnnn




∂p1/∂ai
...
∂pn/∂ai

 =


0
...
0
∂Di/∂pi
0
...
0


,
where the nonzero entry on the right-hand side is in the ith row. Applying Cramer’s
rule and accounting for exchangeability (by [A2]) yields
dpi
dai
=
∂Di/∂pi
h
Πiii + (n− 2)Πiij
i
¡
Πiii
¢2
+ (n− 2)ΠiiiΠiij − (n− 1)
³
Πiij
´2 > 0, j 6= i. (B2)
In the unique interior equilibrium, the denominator of (B2) must be positive. The
numerator, in turn, is positive by [A3], since the latter implies Πiii+(n− 1)Πiij < 0.
Manipulating the numerator yields
dpi
dai
=
¡
Πiii
¢2
+ (n− 2)ΠiiiΠiij −
£
Πiii − ∂Di/∂pi
¤ h
Πiii + (n− 2)Πiij
i
¡
Πiii
¢2
+ (n− 2)ΠiiiΠiij − (n− 1)
³
Πiij
´2 .
Now, observe that dpi/dai ≤ 1 if£
Πiii − ∂Di/∂pi
¤ £
Πiii + (n− 2)Πiij
¤
≥ (n− 1)
¡
Πiij
¢2 . (B3)
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We know from assumption [A3] that¯¯
Πiii + (n− 2)Πiij
¯¯
> Πiij .
For (B3) to hold, it thus suﬃces to show that¯¯
Πiii − ∂Di/∂pi
¯¯
≥ (n− 1)Πiij . (B4)
Again, assumption [A3] guarantees that (B4) is satisfied. mii ≤ 1 now follows
immediately from the first-order condition (B1). Thus, we have shown that 0 <
mii ≤ 1.
We now show that 0 ≤ mji < mii for j 6= i. Solving the system of equations
for the derivative dpj/dai yields
dpSj
dai
= −
∂Di/∂piΠiij¡
Πiii
¢2
+ (n− 2)ΠiiiΠiij − (n− 1)
³
Πiij
´2 ≥ 0,
where the denominator is the same as in (B2) and the numerator is nonnegative
by assumption [A1]. Clearly, dpi/dai > dpj/dai if¯¯
Πiii + (n− 2)Πiij
¯¯
> Πiij ,
or if ¯¯
Πiii
¯¯
> (n− 1)Πiij ,
which is guaranteed by assumption [A3]. We now use the fact that the demand
functions are symmetric, which implies that retail prices are also symmetric. We
thus have 0 ≤ mji < mii. It now follows immediately that 0 ≤ mji < mii ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. For any given eﬀort level e¯, it is suﬃcient for
retail prices to be higher under separation that access prices under separation are
at least as high as retail prices under integration, i.e.,
aSi (e¯) ≥ pIi (c(e¯)) =⇒ pSi (aS(e¯)) > pIi (c(e¯)), for all i.
Using (4) and (7), we may write the relation aSi (e¯) ≥ pIi (c(e¯)) in terms of Lerner
indices as
ESi +XS−i ≥ EIi +XI−i, for all i.
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The claim follows immediately from rewriting the latter condition as
¡
ESi −EIi
¢
+
¡
XS−i −XI−i
¢
≥ 0, for all i.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider market 1. For any given eﬀort e¯,
the retail price is higher under liberalization than under integration if
EL1 +XL−1 > EI1 +XI1 .
Now consider the other markets i 6= 1. Using (4), (14) and (15) the fact that
retail prices must be larger than access prices by the profit maximizing behavior
of downstream firms, we may write pLi > pIi , i 6= 1, in terms of Lerner indices as
ELi +XL−i ≥ EIi +XI−i, for i 6= 1.
Rewriting these conditions as
¡
EL1 −EI1
¢
+
¡
XL−1 −XI−1
¢
> 0, and¡
ELi −EIi
¢
+
¡
XL−i −XI−i
¢
≥ 0, for all i 6= 1.
establishes the claim.
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